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I. INTRODUCTION

GPS technology is not new, but in the recent past, it has become so
widespread that it now affects most everyone's lives. The term "GPS"
refers to a "global positioning system," by which a GPS tracking device
communicates through satellites to reveal its precise location. Since GPS
units are now mandatorily built into all cellular telephones, service
providers can locate their users wherever they may be, if required to do
so.'
Yet, because of the intimate, locational nature of GPS data, these
technologies have engendered privacy questions which beg closer
examination, particularly due to the potential law enforcement (or other
government) exploitation of GPS locational information. The present
commentary will address whether individuals have an expectation of
privacy in the GPS information that their cellular telephones transmit.
With this objective in view, this Article focuses particularly on the Florida
Constitution's two privacy provisions, sections 12 and 23 of article I.
The first portion of this Article will therefore closely examine the rules,
uses, and potential applications of sections 12 and 23 alone, without regard
to GPS technology. This initial discussion will establish the framework for
the subsequent hypothetical applications of sections 12 and 23
jurisprudence to cellular telephone communications, contentless locational
technology, and finally, to GPS itself. By considering the application of
sections 12 and 23 to this broad range of technology, this Article
contextualizes the GPS privacy questions that the constitutional provisions
potentially protect.
Since there is no Florida case law directly addressing the question of
GPS-cellular devices under sections 12 or 23, the following analysis
depends partially on legal predictions. The case law related to this subject
matter, albeit peripherally, suggests the Florida courts' future position on
GPS privacy and serves as a predictor of future legal reasoning.
In order to arrive at predictive analysis, this Article begins by
elaborating the constitutional privacy framework for article I, sections 12
and 23 of the Florida Constitution.
1. All cellular telephones are now equipped with GPS locators. These devices regularly
provide signals to satellites which, in turn, relay the user's location data to the cell phone provider.
The cellular company may choose to ignore the data much of the time, but the location data is
nonetheless being received by it at regular intervals as long as the handset is within the network's
range and is turned on. Although rare, some sophisticated cellular telephones even transmit GPS
location data when the handset is turned off. These satellite updates allow the cellular provider to
pinpoint the user's position within a maximum distance of 300 feet.
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II. THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION

Much like the U.S. Constitution, the Florida Constitution protects the
privacy of its people in several ways. In addition to the constitutional
privacy which protects decisional autonomy,2 both constitutions prohibit
government intrusions into personal zones where an expectation of privacy
exists.
Apart from the decisional type of privacy, the Florida Constitution
protects Floridians against two other types of privacy invasions by the
state. First, it explicitly protects against unreasonable searches, seizures,
and private communication interceptions, most typically Where such
intrusions arise in the context of a police investigation for criminal
evidence. This privacy right is embodied in article I, section 12 of the
Florida Constitution, which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against
the unreasonable interception of private communications by any
means, shall not be violated. No warrant shall be issued except
upon probable cause . . . . This right shall be construed in
conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States
Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court .... 3

As this phraseology indicates, section 12 does not offer any broader or
narrower privacy right than that provided by the Fourth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, and must be interpreted accordingly by the Florida
courts. The Florida Constitution therefore differs in no way from the
federal constitution regarding matters of search and seizure.
2. This references the decisional autonomy crafted by the U.S. Supreme Court in its
landmark contraception rights decision, Griswold v. Connecticut, and was created as an implicit
extension of constitutional substantive due process. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
It was also deemed to have been derived from several constitutional amendments, rather than from
a single explicit constitutional provision. Id. at 484. This type of "privacy" protects one's personal
choices from state intervention in the areas of child-rearing, contraception, and marriage. The same
privacy right to decisional autonomy exists under article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution,
as evidenced by In re T. W., in which the rights of a minor to terminate her pregnancy were analyzed
by the Florida Supreme Court. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1191-92 (Fla. 1989). However, the
decisional autonomy aspect of section 23 will not be dealt with in this Article; instead, it will
consider whether cellular GPS technologies, when used by government entities, could amount to
a privacy violation under article I, section 23.
3. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (1982).
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There is, however, a second type of privacy guaranteed by the Florida
Constitution. This second constitutional privacy right is located in article
I, section 23, and unlike its implied federal counterpart, it is articulated
explicitly as follows:
Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
governmental intrusion into the person's private life except as
otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to
limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings as
provided by law.4
This provision offers a broad, general privacy right proscribing
government invasions into private life. It not only affects the decisional
areas of marriage, contraception, and related aspects of personal
autonomy,5 but also is invoked to prevent government disclosure of
personal information 6 and the state's own acquisition of proprietary
information7 without the owner's consent.8 It is the latter (non-decisional)
coverage of section 23 that will be addressed in this Article, rather than the
personal autonomy element of the provision.
Since GPS technologies may involve potential privacy invasions
through warrantless government searches for criminal evidence, the
possible application of article I, section 12 will be addressed in the
analysis that follows. The application of section 23 privacy will also be
explored here, because the GPS location of cellular telephones is not
limited to criminal searches for evidence, and may additionally arise where

4. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1998).
5. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1191. This case involved the personal autonomy right of a
woman and her fundamental right to make contraception choices.
6. See Rasmussen v. S. Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987). In Rasmussen,
the personal information and identities of confidential blood donors could not be disclosed by the
government, despite the plaintiff's subpoena attempts to obtain this information. Id. at 536-37. The
privacy interests of blood donors, under article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution, outweighed
the plaintiffs interest in receiving this information. Id.
7. Mozo v. State, 632 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). In Mozo, the government
had illegally intercepted the appellant's telephone calls, which amounted to an invasion of both the
appellant's section 12 privacy (unlawful interception) and section 23 privacy (invasion of the right
to be left alone from government intrusion). Id. at 635. When appealed to the Florida Supreme
Court, the same decision was reached. State v. Mozo, 655 So. 2d 1115, 1117 (Fla. 1995). Yet, since
the decision could be reached more simply without discussion of sections 12 and 23, the Florida
Supreme Court avoided addressing the constitutional issues. Id.
8. Since section 23 of the Florida Constitution is only two decades old, it will surely evolve
to reveal additional applications in the future that are beyond the scope of those listed here.
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a government entity attempts to obtain locational information for other
purposes.
Within this framework, the Article will consider the extent to which
either sections 12 or 23 are applicable to the warrantless government
interception of GPS locator signals in cellular telephones. In order to do
so, however, the legal parameters and applications of sections 12 and 23
must first be defined more acutely, beginning with section 12.
A. Article I, Section 12 of the FloridaConstitution:Its Scope
The Florida courts have reiterated that, since the 1982 amendment of
section 12, the legal analysis applied to section 12 should be the same as
that used for the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 9 Therefore,
the Florida courts must rely on the precedential case law from the U.S.
Supreme Court itself and the developments which that Court permitted to
evolve over time. For this reason, the Article will explain the appropriate
analysis used for section 12 with the aid of leading U.S. Supreme Court
cases.
As discussed below, to ascertain section 12 or Fourth Amendment
privacy, three elements must be established: (1) whether the party claiming
a privacy right indeed had a reasonable expectation of privacy, (2) whether
the government conducted a "search," and (3) whether, if a search was
conducted, it was nonetheless "reasonable" enough to avoid constitutional
privacy scrutiny.' ° Ordinarily, a warrant authorizing a search or the
consent of the searched individual will render the search "reasonable."
The Fourth Amendment and article I, section 12 of the Florida
Constitution both require freedom from unreasonable government
intrusion into the constitutionally protected areas of a citizen's life, 1
including one's private home, car, hotel room, phone booth, and locker.
For this reason, a warrantless search of one's home or car is
unconstitutional in Florida, absent the owner's consent. 2 However, in
most cases, the government must make an actual intrusion into the
protected private space in order for a "search" to have been committed in
violation of section 12 or the Fourth Amendment. 3 Thus, mere visual

9. Madsen v. Florida, 502 So. 2d 948, 949 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
10. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
11. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511-12 (1961) (stating this requirement of the
Fourth Amendment). Section 12 of the Florida Constitution similarly states this principle. FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 12 (1982).
12. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990); Tollett v. State, 272 So. 2d 490,493 (Fla.
1973).
13. See Silverman, 365 U.S. at 510-12.
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surveillance of the exterior of one's home or car does not constitute an
intrusion or search and is therefore lawful.
On the other hand, there is some authority which modifies this general
rule. For instance, when a government entity searches the portion of one's
home or yard which is visible to the public eye, this may constitute a
"search," yet may nonetheless be deemed "reasonable" enough not to
violate either federal or Florida constitutional privacy. 14 Most authorities
have held that any visual surveillance possible with the naked eye, even
with the use of some visual enhancement technology, does
not "search" a
15
citizen's private places and is therefore constitutional.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, there are also limits on
technologically-aided searches and a point at which government
technology can no longer escape constitutional scrutiny, both under the
Florida and federal constitutions. As a general rule, if the government uses
"sense-enhancing technology" to obtain information from one's private
space without physical intrusion, this is a "search" if the technology used
is not in "general public use."' 6 This observation was made in Kyllo v.
UnitedStates, in which thermal imaging technology had17been used by the
police outside a home to ascertain the home's contents.
As Kyllo demonstrates, there is a limit to the permissible use of
technology in obtaining private information from an individual's
constitutionally protected areas. In short, the government may use
commonplace technologies to ascertain a person's whereabouts (within
constitutionally protected space) or to determine the contents of that
private space, but only with technology which is in "general public use." 8
Seeing through walls is not permitted, unless a warrant authorizes the use
of such technology. 9
B. Article I, Section 23 of the FloridaConstitution:Its Scope
While some authorities insist that section 23 cannot apply to the
privacy zone already encompassed by section 12,20 other authorities have
14. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 104 (1998) (Breyer, J., concurring).
15. In Dow Chemicalv. UnitedStates, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the government had
not illegally searched a manufacturer's private curtilage when using satellite aerial imaging. Dow
Chem. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235, 238-39 (1986). This type of surveillance did not
constitute a search because human visualization of these protected areas was made possible with
the naked eye, albeit a vastly enhanced naked eye. Id.
16. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
17. Id. at 30.
18. Id. at 34.
19. Id. at 40.
20. As Robert Whorf has noted:

20061
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ruled to the contrary.2 1 Based on these authorities, however, it would
appear that section 23 indeed can apply to section 12 search and seizure
subject matter in the broader "right to be left alone" sense. Despite this,
relatively few courts have proceeded to undertake a section 23 analysis
where the more directly relevant section 12 analysis is already adequate to
analyze a criminal search, seizure, or communication interception case.
Section 23 may occasionally prove necessary to secure privacy even in
criminal matters, particularly where section 12 is not available to a
defendant. Recall that section 12 can only be invoked where there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy and the protected information is
contained in a private home, car, hotel room, locker, or phone booth. Like
section 12, section 23 also requires an expectation of privacy, but does not
mandate that the protected information be located in a contained private
space, such as one's home or car. Nor is section 23 privacy automatically
defeated because the government has a warrant for the information sought,
Florida courts have generally endeavored to minimize confusion created by the
apparent overlap of sections 12 and 23. In that endeavor, they have sought to
foreclose any tendency for interpretation under section 23 to override the effect
of the conformity requirement of section 12 ....Therefore, article I, section 12
is likely to be applied in criminal contexts while article I, section 23 is more likely
to be applied in non-criminal contexts .... The Florida Supreme Court has

construed "criminal context" rather broadly to avoid application of article I,
section 23 in favor of application of article I, section 12.
Robert H. Whorf, The PrivacyInterestsofFloridiansand the Effect of "Conformity" underFlorida
ConstitutionArticle 1, Section 12, 2 BARRY L. REv. 3, 7 (2001) (citing State v. Smith, 641 So. 2d
849,851 (Fla. 1994)). Whorf further explains that "[t]he Florida Supreme Court has said that article
I, section 23 'does not modify the applicability of article I, section 12."' Id. (citing State v. Hume,
512 So. 2d 185, 188 (Fla. 1987)). The Florida Supreme Court's concern in Hume was that section
23 might expand the search, seizure, and interception protection afforded by section 12 beyond that
of the Fourth Amendment. Hume, 512 So. 2d at 185. This is the underlying rationale for keeping
sections 12 and 23 as separate as possible in scope.
21. For instance, in Mozo v. State, Justice Anstead of the Fourth District Court of Appeals
reasoned that both sections 12 and 23 of the Florida Constitution, article I, should apply to cordless
telephone conversations electronically intercepted by police, without a warrant, from outside a
suspect's home. Mozo v. State, 632 So. 2d 623, 631-38 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). Although
sections 12 and 23 each applied differently to these facts, the inclusion of section 12 in the analysis
did not exclude the applicability of section 23. Nor did the fact that the matter was one of a criminal
nature. Id. Additionally, in Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, the government had
subpoenaed a citizen's banking records for a criminal investigation. Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel
Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 546 (Fla. 1985). Section 23 of the Florida Constitution, article I, formed
the basis of the Florida Supreme Court's privacy analysis in this decision, despite the fact that this
was a criminal matter (ordinarily reserved for section 12 analysis). Id. at 546-48. The case law
therefore suggests a zone of overlap that entails the privacy protections of both sections 12 and 23
of the Florida Constitution, article I.
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unlike section 12 privacy. Part 2.C below explains how section 23 privacy
therefore applies to a broader range of subject matter than the more limited
section 12.
Yet, apart from this distinction between sections 12 and 23 privacy,
there is indeed a zone of overlap where both sections 12 and 23 can protect
a citizen's personal information under the Florida Constitution. While, as
previously stated, section 23 cannot extend the scope of section 12, there
is no reason why section 23 cannot apply independently to prevent the
state from obtaining one's personal information without reference to
section 12.22
Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, is the leading case in
Florida establishing the legal parameters of article I, section 23.23 In
Winfield, Justice Adkins begins by acknowledging that privacy under
section 23 is a "fundamental right,, 24 much like the privacy right
recognized under the U.S. Constitution.2 ' As such, it follows that the
standard of review is one of strict scrutiny, and accordingly, the state must
demonstrate a compelling 26interest before it can supersede one's
fundamental right to privacy.
The first step in article I, section 23 analysis is for a court to determine
whether the individual actually has a "legitimate expectation of privacy. 27
In Winfield, the Florida Supreme Court recognized that the petitioners did
have a valid expectation of privacy in their personal banking records and
in the maintenance of their confidentiality. 8 If the individual relying on
section 23 does not possess this reasonable expectation, a court will not
pursue the analysis further, and the government may obtain access to the
personal information it seeks.29
On the other hand, if the legitimate expectation of privacy exists, then
the second step in the Winfield analysis is to determine whether the
government has a compelling state interest in obtaining the individual's
personal information.3" This second step led Justice Overton, in his
Forsbergv. Housing Authority of the City of Miami Beach concurrence,
to call the section 23 test a "balancing test," whereby the "privacy interests

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Hume, 512 So. 2d at 188.
Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 546-48.
Id. at 547.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 547.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 548.
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of the individual must be weighed against the public interest."31 In
Winfield, the government did have a compelling interest in investigating
the pari-mutuel industry effectively, and this interest was held to outweigh
the petitioner's own interest in bank record personal privacy.32
Finally, the third prong of the Winfield test requires the government to
show that it obtained or attempted to obtain the private information
through the least intrusive means.33 If this prong is met, the government's
compelling interest will successfully outweigh the section 23 privacy
interest of the citizen in question.34 This is precisely what transpired in
Winfield, since the government demonstrated that it had used a subpoena
to obtain the petitioner's bank records. Because a subpoena was less
invasive than the other means available to seize bank information, the
Supreme Court of Florida ruled that the
government had met all three
35
test.
balancing
23
section
the
of
prongs
Although the foregoing three-part test has been set out clearly in
Winfield, there remains much that we do not know about article I, section
23 of the'Florida Constitution. For this Article, it is useful to understand
how broadly section 23 can be applied to personal information, and to
what type of information. Section 23's scope is particularly important
since understanding it may assist in determining how, analogously, it
might translate into potential GPS privacy protection.
The Florida case law says that section 23 can form a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the following personal information: personal
banking records;36 personal autopsy records;37 cordless telephone
communications intercepted by the police;38 private data emanating from
a telephone pen register (i.e. intercepted "caller ID"); 39 private
identification information of blood donors, even in the face of a
31. Forsberg v. Hous. Auth. of Miami Beach, 455 So. 2d 373, 379 (Fla. 1984) (Overton, J.,
concurring).
32. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 548.
33. Id. at 547.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 548.
36. Id.
37. Campus Commc'ns, Inc. v. Earnhardt, 821 So. 2d 388, 392-93 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2002).
38. Mozo v. State, 632 So. 2d 623, 634 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). On appeal, this case
was decided by the Florida Supreme Court on a non-constitutional basis. State v. Mozo, 655 So.
2d 1115, 1117 (Fla. 1995). However, the fact that this matter was ruled on by the Florida Supreme
Court on different grounds does not rule out the otherwise valid constitutional legal analysis made
by Justice Anstead in his decision from the Fourth District Court of Appeals.
39. Shaktman v. State, 529 So. 2d 711,715 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Shaktman v. State,
553 So. 2d 148, 149 (Fla. 1989).
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subpoena; 40 and medical and other personal information contained in the
files of judicial proceedings, unless the information becomes an integral
part of the judicial proceeding. 4'
On the other hand, section 23 does not create a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the following areas: personal information, such as private email found in a government computer; 42 records providing the personal
information of tenants and all other persons who ever applied to live in
public housing complexes; 43 the contentless private data emitted from a
personal pocket pager or "beeper," when intercepted by the police;"
privileged medical or psychiatric reports, when disclosed to the state bar
for admission to practice; 45 and personal information regarding one's
smoking habits. 46
Thus, at the present time, the classes of personal information that can
be protected by section 23 are not defined by any precise rule. To date,
what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy under section 23 has
been a matter of judicial discretion in Florida. Until many more cases are
tried by the Florida courts, the defining threshold between unprotected
privacy and protected subject matter shall remain a blurred line.
What is clear, however, is that article I, section 23 of the Florida
Constitution affords a broader right of anti-disclosural and anti-invasive
privacy than the Federal Constitution. Although the balancing test used by
the Florida courts for section 23 was crafted on the federal model,47 U.S.
40. Rasmussen v. S. Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 534 (Fla. 1987).
41. Barron v. Fla. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So. 2d 113, 119 (Fla. 1988); Cape Publ'ns,
Inc., v. Hitchner, 549 So. 2d 1374, 1376 (Fla. 1989).
42. State v. City of Clearwater, 863 So. 2d 149, 150 (Fla. 2003).
43. Forsberg v. Hous. Auth. of Miami Beach, 455 So. 2d 373, 375 (Fla. 1984).
44. Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178, 1180 (Fla. 1981).
45. Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71, 74-76 (Fla. 1984).
46. City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1026 (Fla. 1995).
47. Forsberg,455 So. 2d at 374-80 (Overton, J., concurring). Forsberg set the stage for
Winfield, which immediately followed it and adhered largely to Overton's concurrence in Forsberg.
See Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 547-48 (Fla. 1985). However, in
the majority Winfield opinion, Justice Adkins noted that the federal balancing test for privacy is
distinguishable from the type of non-disclosural and non-invasive privacy right that section 23
guarantees. Id. at 546. He remarked that Supreme Court cases should be limited to privacy in
connection with personal autonomy, stating:
Other privacy interests enunciated by the Court in Nixon v. Administrator of
GeneralServices, 433 U.S. 425, 97 S.Ct. 277, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977), and Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 97 S.Ct. 869, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1976), involve one's interest
in avoiding the public disclosure of personal matters. However, Nixon, Whalen,
and those cases involving the autonomy zone of privacy are not directly applicable
to the case at bar.
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constitutional cases show considerable reticence in recognizing the
disclosural privacy right.
For instance, in Whalen v. Roe, the U.S. Supreme Court was reluctant
to formally acknowledge a fundamental privacy right in non-disclosural
subject matter.48 In his majority opinion, Justice Stevens remarked that the
government collection of personal data "require[s] the orderly preservation
of great quantities of information, much of which is personal in character
and potentially embarrassing or harmful if disclosed."4 9 The Court did not
reject constitutional non-disclosural privacy altogether, but fell short of
making this right equal to personal autonomy privacy, a fundamental
freedom.5"
As Erwin Chemerinsky has observed, "[A]lthough there is a strong
argument that the [U.S.] Constitution should be interpreted to protect a
right to control information, there is thus far little support for such a right
from the [U.S.] Supreme Court."'"
Id. In Winfield, the disclosure issue was one of personal banking records and the government's
compelling interest in having access to them. Id. at 548. The government's interest was based on
its need to properly investigate the pari-mutuel industry. Id.
48. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1977).
49. Id. at 605.
50. In Whalen v. Roe, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on a New York law requiring doctors
to report patient prescription drug information to the state government. Id. at 591. This regulation
was intended to curtail drug abuse, and therefore provided a compelling state interest which
outweighed any individual privacy right under the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 597-99. The U.S.
Supreme Court used the balancing test which would later be adopted into Florida's section 23
privacy analysis, but was reluctant to formally assert a fundamental right to non-disclosural, noninvasive privacy under the U.S. Constitution. See supra text accompanying note 47; Whalen, 429
U.S. at 605. The "penumbra" of rights underlying U.S. constitutional privacy, as espoused in prior
case law, did not clearly apply to the non-disclosural privacy context. See Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605. Similarly, in CaliforniaBankersAss'n v. Schultz,
the government's compelling need to curtail banking fraud outweighed the privacy rights of
individuals who, absent the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, would not have endured the disclosure of
their bank transactions to the government. Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
51. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONALLAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 696 (1997). To
a certain extent, this may be regarded as an anomaly in the law's evolution, since Florida's
constitutional privacy has advanced and developed much more quickly than any non-disclosural
privacy right under the U.S. Constitution. In the early twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court
seemed prepared to recognize a non-disclosure, anti-intrusion right of constitutional privacy, back
when this would have been inconceivable in Florida (prior to the addition of section 23 to the
Florida Constitution). In his oft-quoted passage from Olmstead v. United States, the dissenting
Justice Brandeis of the U.S. Supreme Court makes his interpretation of the U.S. Constitution clear:
"The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of
happiness.. . .They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone." Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Thus, the concept of the "right
to be let alone" originated in U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of the Federal Constitution, and
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Furthermore, many Florida cases have explicitly asserted that the
section 23 privacy right is greater than its (still underdeveloped) nondisclosural privacy counterpart in the U.S. Constitution. 2 This observation
is normally made because section 23 is explicit, while the U.S.
Constitution's general privacy notion is found in no one particular
amendment and is largely an implied right. As noted by Justice Overton
in his Forsbergconcurrence, "Although the United States Supreme Court
has recognized a fundamental constitutional right of privacy which applies
in certain limited circumstances, that Court has refused to establish a
general right of privacy under the federal constitution."53
Justice Overton took this observation further in his scholarly writings,
where he and Katherine Giddings wrote:
Article I, section 23 affords greater protection from government
intrusion than the [F]ederal Constitution. The privacy right is
explicit, it extends to all aspects of an individual's private life rather
than simply extending to some elusive 'penumbra' of rights, and it
ensures that the state cannot intrude into an individual's private life
absent a compelling interest.5 4
In Winfield, though Justice Adkins does not state that section 23 affords
an absolute privacy right, he emphasizes that this provision is phrased in
very strong terms. In fact, as noted by Justice Adkins, section 23 was
drafted to avoid creating a mere reasonableness or unreasonableness
standard of privacy, instead favoring a much more firmly entrenched right.
As Justice Adkins remarks:
The citizens of Florida opted for more protection from government
intrusion when they approved article I, section 23, of the Florida
Article I, section 23, was intentionally phrased in
Constitution ....
strong terms. The drafters of the amendment rejected the use of the
words "unreasonable" or "unwarranted" before the phrase
"governmental intrusion" in order to make this privacy right as

was later imported into the Florida Constitution's consideration of section 23. Winfield, 277 So. 2d
at 546. Paradoxically, it seems that the federal privacy right has lost some of its potency along the
way. See, e.g., Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605-06; Schultz, 416 U.S. at 21.
52. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 548; Forsberg,455 So. 2d at 377.
53. Forsberg,455 So. 2d at 377.
54. Ben F. Overton & Katherine E. Giddings, The Right of Privacy in Floridain the Age of
Technology and the Twenty-First Century: A Need for Protectionfrom Privateand Commercial
Intrusion, 25 FLA. ST.U. L. REV. 25, 40-41 (1997).
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strong as possible. Since the people of this state exercised their
prerogative and enacted an amendment to the Florida Constitution
which expressly and succinctly provides for a strong right of
privacy not found in the United States Constitution, it can only be
concluded that the right is much broader in scope than that of the
Federal Constitution. 55
The judicial commentary of Justices Adkins and Overton are
instructive. They aid in determining that section 23 was intended to form
a stronger right than federal constitutional privacy, and one which could
be compromised only in special circumstances. Yet even when
accompanied by the section 23 case law, these commentaries only reveal
a portion of what the parameters of section 23 are now and will evolve to
become in future years. Determining what could or could not be a section
23 zone of privacy is not yet identifiable by any bright line rule or formula.
After two decades of case law, one can still only speculate as to where a
legitimate expectation of privacy might be found by future courts.

55. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 548. In contrast with the remarks that section 23 privacy is
stronger than the Federal Constitution's protection, Timothy Lenz states:
The Florida Supreme Court held in Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid &
Associates that a person's right to disclosural privacy is no greater under the state
constitution than it is under the federal constitution. The court ruled that there was
no state constitutional right to privacy to prevent public disclosure of papers
compiled by a consultant conducting a search for applicants to be managing
director of a public utility. By refusing to construe a state constitutional right of
disclosural privacy, the court, while acknowledging the existence of such a
privacy interest under the federal constitution, held "the federal constitutional
right of privacy [does not] preclude [] dissemination of private information by the
government."
Timothy Lenz, "Rights Talk" aboutPrivacy in State Courts, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1613, 1624-25 (1997)
(referring to the Florida Supreme Court decision of Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schafer, Reid &
Assocs., 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980)). However, what is not apparent from Lenz's observations is
that Shevin is not used for section 23 disclosural privacy analysis, as it was rendered shortly before
the adoption of article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution. It therefore presents an outdated
analysis of disclosural privacy under the Florida Constitution. Arguably, the current view of
Florida's section 23 is that it presents a much more encompassing form of anti-disclosure, antiinvasiveness privacy than the highly undeveloped federal brand discussed earlier in the cases of
Whalen and Schultz. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 589; Schultz, 416 U.S. at 21-22.

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LA W & POLICY

[Vol. I1I

C. The Same "Expectation of Privacy" Under Both Sections 12 & 23 ?
As discussed in the preceding section, privacy under article I, section
12 of the Florida Constitution is limited to places where one enjoys a
reasonable expectation of privacy, 56 such as inside persons' private homes,
cars, hotel rooms, and their private papers.57 This is therefore a limited
zone of privacy, and one which does not easily protect personal
documents, an individual's location in public view, medical records,
personal property, or information that is outside one's vehicle rather than
inside it.58
By contrast, article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution allows for
a broader zone of privacy than section 12, and is not limited to information
or people located in private homes or cars. For instance, in Winfield v.
Division of Pari-MutuelWagering, a citizen's private bank accounts were
deemed to fall within the legitimate expectation of privacy contemplated
by section 23, but not the zone of privacy considered for section 12 or the
Fourth Amendment.59
Yet while the subject matter coverage of these two privacy provisions
differ, the formulas used to identify a privacy expectation under sections
12 and 23 are in many respects related. As will be revealed below,
expectations of privacy under sections 12 and 23 are remarkably similar
despite what judicial commentary purports to the contrary.
There are two notable traits which distinguish section 12 and section
23 expectancies, and they are as follows: First, a section 12 privacy
expectation can only be claimed for the interior of a house, car, hotel
room, telephone booth, locker, private apartment, or similar private
space. 60 By contrast, a section 23 privacy expectation can be claimed
anywhere without restriction, since it is the subject matter of the
information which denotes its private character, rather than the physical
location.61

56. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
57. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,440 (1976).
58. United States v. Mclver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1127 (1999). The Fourth Amendment, which
is analyzed in the same way as article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution, does not guarantee
a reasonable expectation of privacy for GPS tracking devices placed by police on the outside of a
vehicle, as opposed to inside. Id.
59. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 548. Although the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged a
reasonable expectation of privacy for one's personal bank accounts under section 23, ultimately the
account information had to be disclosed because the government's compelling interest outweighed
Winfield's privacy right. Id.
60. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32-33.
61. See Mozo v. State, 632 So. 2d 623, 633 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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Second, section 12 (i.e. Fourth Amendment equivalent) privacy
requires that the individual claiming the privacy right has, in some way,
manifested his own subjective expectation of privacy with regard to his
private space or information.62 However, this subjective manifestation of
privacy must pass a second test: the information or place must be one
which society would objectively regard as private.63 For this reason, the
Fourth Amendment and section 12 case law refers to a "reasonable
expectation of privacy," since society's "reasonable" and objective
perception of the privacy claimed is factored into a court's equation. This
additional measure avoids situations where one has subjectively
manifested his expectation, but the expectation is one which is clearly not
private and should not receive protection from government intrusions.
This differs from section 23 privacy because a section 23 expectation
does not have to be "reasonable" or pass any objective standard. Earlier,
this Article addressed Justice Adkins' remarks from Winfield, in which
Adkins recalled the section 23 drafters' intentions to exclude a
"reasonableness" standard from the section 23 expectation of privacy.'
For this reason, the case law refers to a "legitimate expectation of privacy"
for section 23,65 but a "reasonable expectation of privacy" for section 12.66
The Florida case law has further confirmed this distinction between
sections 12 and 23 expectations, and as Justice Anstead (then of the 4th
District Court of Appeals) remarked in Mozo v. Florida:
A major analytical difficulty faced by the federal courts in... the
Fourth Amendment [i.e. Section 12 equivalent] appears to be
applying the objective prong of the Katz formula: i.e., whether the
defendant was reasonable in his belief of privacy. But... under the
Florida right of privacy [i.e. Section 23], although the subjective
belief must be legitimate, the separate and distinct test of a
reasonable expectation of privacy is eliminated.67
Similarly, in Shaktman v. State, Chief Justice Ehrlich of the Florida
Supreme Court explained that section 23 expectations do not have to be
62. Id. at 634.
63. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33 (where the court noted that "when the government violates a
subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable... search does not occur
... unless 'the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy' ... 'society is willing to
recognize that expectation is reasonable"').
64. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 548.
65. Id.
66. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33.
67. Mozo, 632 So. 2d at 633.
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"reasonable" because society's endorsement of a section 23 privacy
expectation is not required.68 This is in direct contrast with the second
"objective" prong of the section 12 privacy test. Justice Ehrlich,
concurring specially, stated that "[tihe words 'unreasonable' and
'unwarranted' harken back to the federal standard of 'reasonable
expectation of privacy,' [used for section 12] which protects an
individual's expectation of privacy only when society recognizes that it is
reasonable to do so .... [T]he Florida right of privacy was intended to
protect an individual's expectation of privacy regardless of whether
'
society recognizes that expectation as reasonable."69
Justice Ehrlich further established the test used in assessing a section
23 expectation of privacy. According to Ehrlich, society's recognition of
certain personal information as private was irrelevant, since it was the
individual whose own expectations of privacy were to be taken into
account. When enunciating the three-part test for determining a section 23
expectation of privacy, Justice Ehrlich articulated the "spurious or false"
standard, which has become part of the test.7"
In Justice Ehrlich's words, "[T]he zone of privacy covered by article
I, section 23, can be determined only by reference to the expectations of
each individual, and those expectations are protected provided they are not
spurious or false."'" Justice Ehrlich provides the third and most objective
criterion, which despite having passed the first two prongs, serves to defeat
the expectation of privacy if the facts show that the disputed information
is of an inherently public nature,72 or for other reasons should not be
deemed private.73

68. Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 153 (Fla. 1989) (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring specially).
69. Id. (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring specially).
70. Id. (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring specially).
71. Id. (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring specially) (emphasis added).
72. Id. (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring specially). The Forsbergdecision provides an example that
illustrates this final criterion. Forsberg v. Hous. Auth. Of Miami Beach, 455 So. 2d 373, 379 (Fla.
1984) (Overton, J., concurring). In Forsberg,the appellants did not have an expectation of privacy
in public housing records containing personal information about them. Id. It was not that personal
data was not of a private character, but that the public housing records were, by their very nature,
public government documents. Id. Thus, this defeated any legitimate expectation of privacy which
otherwise might have been found in the content of those documents. Id.
73. In sum, Justice Ehrlich's test for section 23 expectations amount to the following three
steps: (i) the information claimed as private must be assessed according to the individual's own
personal expectations; accordingly, the privacy would depend on whether the individual
subjectively perceived his information as private and shielded from government intrusion
("subjective" prong); (ii) however, even if the first criterion is met, the information will not be
deemed private if the claimant's privacy expectation appears to be "spurious or false;" (iii) in order
to assess both of the foregoing factors, all circumstances must be considered, including any
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The latter factor (iii) reveals that the section 23 test for expectations of
privacy is more objective and susceptible to society's general privacy view
than the courts would like to admit. In this regard, the objective factor (iii)
brings section 23 expectations of privacy closer to the section 12 test, since
both contain a subjective (individual-based) prong and an objective
(factual or societal-based) prong. In other words, section 23 may do no
more than denote a hidden "reasonable expectation of privacy" test, rather
than the "legitimate expectation of privacy" standard that the case law
pretends it represents.74
Despite the similarities between sections 12 and 23 expectations of
privacy, the case law reveals that sometimes personal information is not
private enough to satisfy section 12, but will nonetheless meet the
requirements of a section 23 expectation. For instance, in Shaktman, the
majority specifically stated that data collected from a pen register (i.e.
police-intercepted caller ID) does not bear a reasonable expectation of
privacy under section 12.7' However, the same pen register data was
sufficiently private to present a legitimate expectation of privacy under
section 23.76 The Shaktman court ruled that data including the telephone
numbers one has dialed "represents personal information which, in most
the individual has no intention of communicating to a third
circumstances,
' 77
party.

Similarly, in Winfield, the privacy of bank records was not protected by
the Fourth Amendment or article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution.78
By contrast, under Winfield, a legitimate expectation of privacy was found
in the same private bank records under the section 23 analysis.7 9

In short, the tests used to identify an expectation of privacy under
sections 12 and 23 differ only slightly. Even so, section 23 expectations
available "objective" manifestations ("objective" prong) or facts that support a finding of privacy
or a lacking of privacy (e.g., the information is already highly public, which defeats the expectation
of privacy claimed). Shaktman, 553 So. 2d at 153 (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring specially).
74. To demonstrate this point, let us review the section 12 expectation of privacy test once
again, in its three-prongs: (i) a section 12 privacy expectation can only be claimed if the
information is located in the interior of a house, car, hotel room, telephone booth, private
apartment, or similar private space; (ii) the claimant must have manifested his subjective
expectation of privacy with regard to the disputed information ("subjective" prong); (iii) even if
this preceding prong is met, the information or place in which the information was found must
nevertheless be one which society would objectively regard as private ("objective" prong). Kyllo
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2001).
75. Shaktman, 553 So. 2d at 151.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1985).
79. Id.
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have covered a broader range of subject matter because section 12 is
limited to situations where private possessions are located in non-private
spaces.

II. APPLICATION OF SECTIONS

12 & 23

OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION

Having set out the framework and possible applications of the Florida
Constitution, article I, sections 12 and 23, it is now possible to apply these
principles to concrete problems. In particular, the applicability of sections
12 and 23 to GPS-equipped cellular telephones will be the focus of the
following portion of this Article.
To reiterate, applying sections 12 and 23 necessitates that an
expectation of privacy should exist first. The analysis therefore largely
depends on one crucial factor: do users of GPS-equipped cellular
telephones have an expectation of privacy?
The application which follows is necessarily speculative, since there is
no Florida case law dealing with sections 12 or 23 and the relationship of
these provisions to GPS subject matter. In fact, even the case law from
other jurisdictions on this topic is sparse, and it deals only peripherally
with the specific GPS issues. Therefore, this case law contributes nothing
to our knowledge of the GPS-section 23 interface. Thus, the following
predictions are based on the incomplete set of tools currently at our
disposal.
A. Is There an Expectation of Privacy in Cellular Calls?
Before examining GPS, the issue of whether cellular telephones alone
entail an expectation of privacy must be addressed. The issue is whether
cellular calls themselves support a privacy right, in the absence of any
GPS system within the telephone apparatus. If so, does this cellular
privacy right exist when the calls are made in a public place outside the
home or car?
According to the Fourth District Court of Appeals of Florida, cordless
telephone conversations entail an expectation of privacy under both
sections 12 and 23 of the Florida Constitution, article 1.80 In the Mozo
court's decision, Justice Anstead stated that it was unimportant that
cordless calls were not connected by wire to a land line telephone

80. Mozo v. State, 632 So. 2d 623,631-38 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). The conclusion was
later reviewed and affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court on non-constitutional grounds. State v.
Mozo, 655 So. 2d 1115 (1995).
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system."1 The fact that cordless telephones were mobile and, in addition,
could be intercepted more easily by the use of radio waves, did not lower
the expectation of privacy associated with private telephone
conversations .2 Accordingly, the warrantless wire tap discussed in Mozo
was held to be an unconstitutional invasion of privacy under both sections
12 and 23.83
Admittedly, cordless telephones are not the same as cellular phones, as
they are less likely to be used in the privacy of one's home where section
12's Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy is strongest. Thus, the
persuasive value of Mozo is merely analogical to the GPS scenario, and
Mozo is not a binding precedent.
However, a cellular telephone system was reviewed under the federal
scheme in the case of United States for an OrderAuthorizing the Roving
Interceptionof OralCommunications,referred to here as Roving." In this
case, the Ninth Circuit did not use a constitutional theory for protecting
privacy, but instead based its analysis on the federal wiretapping statute."
This statute, which is similar to the constitutional scheme in Florida,
includes elements of privacy expectations, limits on government intrusion,
and a narrowly-tailored requirement.
In Roving, the cellular telephone system under review was a built-in
feature of a luxury car, giving the automobile cellular provider access to
eavesdrop on its authorized subscribers. 86 The FBI sought an
eavesdropping order from the automobile and cellular provider in Roving,
but was denied this privilege because cellular telephones, even when used
outside one's home, involve an expectation of privacy. Additionally, the
order sought by the FBI could not be narrowly tailored under the
circumstances.8 7

81. Mozo, 632 So. 2d at 634.
82. Id. at 634-35.
83. Id. at 632, 634.
84. United States for an Order Authorizing the Roving Interception of Oral Commc'ns, 349
F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003).
85. Id.at1136.18U.S.C.§2510(2002); 18U.S.C.§2511(2002); 18U.S.C.§2518(1998);
18 U.S.C. § 2522 (1994). Sections 2510 and 2518 were given closest attention in this case.
86. Roving, 349 F.3d at 1133-35.
87. Id. at 1144-46. Rather than using the constitutional term "narrowly-tailored," the circuit
court referred to compliance with the eavesdropping order "unobtrusively and with a minimum of
interference." Id. at 1145. According to the circuit court, minimal interference (narrow tailoring)
was not met because the eavesdropping order would unduly have invaded the expectation of
privacy by forcing the automobile and cellular company's employees to continue using their
resources to eavesdrop, and by disabling the user's ability to make outgoing calls. Id. at 1144-46.
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Using language that resembles Fourth Amendment and section 12
(Florida Constitution) reasoning, the Roving court remarked that "the
occupants of the vehicle reasonably expected that words spoken between
'
them would be private, not subject to interception or transmission. 88
Therefore, an expectation of privacy was recognized with respect to
cellular telephone communications within a private vehicle.
According to the circuit court, cellular telephones afforded the same
degree of privacy
as normal land-lines because they were in fact not
"wireless" at all. 89 This is because wires and cables are physically part of
the electronic mechanism enabling the wireless connection.90 For this
reason, the term "wireless" only relates to the end-user cellular telephone
device, without altering the underlying wire-inherent nature of all
telephone communications, including those that are portable. 9 The circuit
court phrased its opinion in the following manner: "Despite the apparent
wireless nature of cellular phones, communications using cellular phones
are considered wire communications under the statute, because cellular
telephones use wire and cable connections when connecting calls." 92
Since cellular users have an expectation of privacy within the Roving
context, 93 do cellular callers have a privacy expectation when they are not
in a private car or other Fourth Amendment and section 12 private space?
There is a strong argument that, as an extension of Roving, privacy in
cellular calls made in public places may similarly be protected, given the
Roving court's observation that cellular communications are
indistinguishable from ordinary wire communications insofar as
wiretapping, eavesdropping, and arguably similar government invasions
of privacy are concerned. 94
Also consider the Fifth District Court of Appeals of Florida case, State
v. McConnick.95 In McCormick, an interception order was sought by the
police for cellular telephone calls under the Florida wiretap statute. 96 The
calls intercepted were made in various locations, but not always in the

88. Id. at 1138.
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. See Roving, 349 F.3d at 1138.
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. See id. The circuit court stated that "communications using cellular phones are considered
wire communications .... "Id.
95. State v. McCormick, 719 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
96. Id. at 1221; see FLA. STAT. ch. 934.07 (2002) & 934.09(1)(a) (2004). The Florida wiretap
statute was modeled after its federal counterpart statute discussed in Mozo above, and is extremely
similar to it
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user's private home or car. 97 The McCormick court reproduced the New

Jersey Superior Court's comments from State v. Tango that "a cellular
phone has no fixed location" for interception (and resulting privacy)
purposes.98 In McCormick, Justice Goshom stated that an interception
takes place both where the telephone is located (i.e. the cellular user's
current location) and where the physical wiretap takes place. 99
This analysis is relevant to interpreting the wiretap statute and not
necessarily article I of the Florida Constitution, sections 12 and 23.
However, McCormick reveals that a government intrusion into one's
private cellular space occurs both at the cellular user's location and the
wire-bound location where the government listens in.' °° Therefore, even
if there is no privacy expectation where the cellular user is located, the
user may still have a privacy expectation in the place where the wiretap
occurs (even though the user is not physically present there).,'O As Roving
states, cellular telephones are the same as land lines for privacyinterception purposes, due to the0 wire-bound
nature of all telephone
2
otherwise.
or
cellular
connections,
In short, the law is by no means clear on this issue. Yet a strong
argument exists that cellular communications could entail privacy
expectations under section 12, even when made or received outside one's
private home, car, or hotel room. Even in the absence of a Fourth
Amendment and section 12 privacy expectation, publicly made cellular
calls may enjoy a broader privacy expectation found under article I,
section 23 of the Florida Constitution. As discussed in Part lI.C of this
Article, many private communications and information types do not
qualify for section 12 protection. However, these communications will
satisfy section 23's less restrictive expectation of privacy standard, and
thereby be shielded from government intrusion.
Accordingly, how can one determine whether cellular calls made in
public meet the privacy standard of article I, section 23 of the Florida

97. McCormick, 719 So. 2d at 1221-23.
98. Id. at 1221.
99. Id. at 1222.
100. Id. However, this seems to be at odds with the Florida Supreme Court's decision in State
v. Mozo, in which it was determined that "[t]he actual 'interception' of a communication occurs not
where such is ultimately heard or recorded but where the communication originates." State v.
Mozo, 655 So. 2d 1115, 1117 (Fla. 1995). In either case, the cellular user could argue that he had
a constitutional expectation of privacy in the place where his calls were physically tapped.
101. See Mozo, 655 So. 2d at 1117. This inference is analogical to the McCormick court's
findings, although McCormick does not specifically address any constitutional issues.
102. United States for an Order Authorizing the Roving Interception of Oral Commc'ns, 349
F.3d 1132, 1138 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Constitution? To answer this question, cellular communications would
have to meet the three-part Shaktman test discussed earlier.1 3 A defendant
would have to show that: (a) he subjectively perceived his cellular calls
would remain private and free from government intrusion; (b) this
perception was not spurious or false; and (c) no additional circumstances
existed to defeat this alleged privacy expectation."
There is no concrete answer to this question given the open-ended
flexibility of the Shaktman test. Yet, taking the foregoing into account, it
is not unlikely that cellular users have at least a section 23 privacy
expectation, if not the more restrictive section 12 type.
B. Technologies Which Extract Contentful PersonalInformation
The legal principles addressed thus far become more complicated when
a new variable is introduced into the equation: even though sections 12 and
23 may protect a privacy right in cellular conversations, can the same
privacy expectation be claimed for contentless data? In other words, where
contentless GPS data is part of a cellular telephone's functions, can it be
relied on to claim a privacy expectation under the Florida Constitution?
Since there is no case law dealing with GPS and its relationship to
sections 12 or 23, this issue will be approached by relying on case law
from Florida and other jurisdictions addressing related privacy matters.
The case law offers some, albeit limited, guidance into government
intrusions on contentless technology (i.e., pocket pagers, tracking beepers,
pen registers), which is instructive for our analogous GPS purposes. The
cases discussed here arise in the search and seizure context, and therefore
frame privacy expectations solely in the more restrictive section 12
(Fourth Amendment) sphere. These cases will nonetheless aid in locating
privacy expectations in comparable circumstances under section 23.
The Washington Supreme Court recently commented,
[T]he intrusion into private affairs made possible with a GPS device
is quite extensive as the information obtained can disclose a great
deal about an individual's life. For example, the device can provide
a detailed record of travel to doctors' offices, banks, gambling
casinos, tanning salons, places of worship, political party meetings,
bars, grocery stores, exercise gyms, places where children are
dropped off for school, play, or day care, the upper scale restaurant
and the fast food restaurant, the strip club, the opera, the baseball

103. Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 153 (Fla. 1989) (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring specially).
104. Id. (Ehrlich, C.J., concurring specially).
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game, the "wrong" side of town, the family planning clinic, the
labor rally.105

These judicial observations illustrate that GPS information does not
constitute solely raw data. Indeed, GPS transmissions can disclose a great
deal about one's private life and, in some situations, more detail than a
private telephone conversation. This is despite a telephone conversation's
content automatically enjoying a "reasonable expectation of privacy"
under section 12 (Fourth Amendment) because of its inherently personal
nature. Paradoxically, the same legal protection is not clearly afforded for
GPS devices and the personal information GPS equipment transmits to
others, including government authorities.
New technologies can detect private information about individuals
which, until recently, was undetectable through ordinary human faculties.
Keeping this in mind, the courts have sought to preserve the privacy
expectations citizens previously enjoyed in the absence of these invasive
new technologies.
For instance, people enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in
whatever activity they pursue at home, even though police technology can
virtually "see through" their homes to search for evidence. This was
exemplified in Kyllo v. United States, where the police used thermal
imaging technology that enabled them to detect drug activity inside the
petitioner's home."° Police exploitation of this new technology was seen
as a form of cheating, and on this basis, the Supreme Court found the
police had conducted an illegal and warrantless search, violating
petitioner's reasonable expectation of privacy. 7 Additionally, the Court
stated even though no physical intrusion had occurred, the home was a
constitutionally protected area and therefore, "'intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area,' Silverman, 365 U.S., at 512, 81 S.Ct. 679,
constitutes a search - at least where (as here) the technology in question
is not in general public use."' 8
Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court formulated a new rule in 2001:
the government can only conduct warrantless searches of constitutionally
private information and places if it does so with unenhanced human senses
or, at the very least, with sense-enhancing technologies which are in
widespread use."° To this rule, Justice Scalia added:

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 223 (Wash. 2003).
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Id.at 40.
Id. at 34.
Id. at40.
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[I]f, without technology, the police could not discern volume
without being actually present in the phone booth, Justice
STEVENS should conclude a search has occurred. Cf. Karo, 468
U.S., at 735, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) .... The same should hold for the interior heat
of the home if only a person present in the home could discern the
heat.1°

Here, Justice Scalia refers to Katz v. United States, in which the
technological enhancements of a "bug" permitted the government to listen
in on the petitioner's private conversation while he was in a telephone
booth.1 Since the police would not have been able to overhear the
petitioner's conversation with their normal human faculties in the absence
of a wiretap warrant, the "bugging" technology enhancement was deemed
in violation of the petitioner's Fourth Amendment right
an illegal search
12
privacy.
to
By contrast, visual enhancement technology that merely offers a better
vantage point does not violate a person's expectation of privacy. As such,
satellite aerial imaging in Dow Chemical Co. v. UnitedStates and airplaneview imaging in Californiav. Ciraoloand Floridav. Riley were deemed
permissible searches by the U.S. Supreme Court, provided they did not
invade areas immediately adjacent to a private home or peer into the home
itself. 3 The Supreme Court ruled aerial views were "public
thoroughfares" on which the police were not obligated to hide their eyes. 1 4
Additionally, referring to technological privacy invasions generally, the
Kyllo Court critically remarked:
It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to
citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by
the advance of technology. For example, as the cases discussed
above make clear, the technology enabling human flight has
exposed to public view (and hence, we have said, to official
observation) uncovered portions of the house and its curtilage that
once were private ....

The question we confront today is what

110. Id. at 39.
111. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
112. Id. at 354-59.
113. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215
(1986); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236-39 (1986).
114. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.
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limits there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm
of guaranteed privacy." 5
What distinguishes these cases, however, from the ones which follow
is the contentful nature of the information retrieved by technological
means. The foregoing cases generally recognize a section 12 (Fourth
Amendment) privacy expectation where the government enables itself,
through extraordinary technology, to see into private homes and listen into
private telephone booths to intercept contentful private conversations. In
order to frame these cases in contrast with others, the jurisprudence
discussed in Part II.C below analyzes contentless personal information
and its interception which, as will be revealed, presents a lesser threat to
privacy. Even where contentless personal information is extracted from
private spaces, it will be shown that a lesser expectation of privacy still
exists.
C. Technologies Which Extract Contentless ElectronicInformation
First consider the use of numerical detection technology in the pen
register line of cases. In the words of the U.S. Supreme Court, "[W]e
doubt that people in general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in
the numbers they dial. All telephone users realize that they must 'convey'
phone numbers to the telephone company.

. .

and similar devices are

routinely used by telephone companies."'1 6 In Smith v. Maryland, 17 the
U.S. Supreme Court majority deduced that no reasonable expectation of
privacy existed in the telephone numbers dialed by an individual in the
privacy of his home. 1 ' In Smith, police asked the local telephone company
to electronically trace all telephone numbers dialed by a suspect, and the
telephone provider did so using a pen register device which identified the
clicking patterns of rotary telephones.119 This operation was conducted
without a warrant, yet in the absence of any reasonable expectation of
privacy, the intrusion was held to be lawful.12 °
At this juncture, one must inquire as to why there is no expectation of
privacy for the purely numerical data which rotary telephones provide. In
other words, why does a telephone conversation merit a constitutional
expectation of privacy, whereas the numbers dialed by the telephone do
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-34.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
Id.
Id.
ld. at 737-42.
Id. at 742-45.
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not? This very point was raised by the petitioner in Smith. The Court
observed, "Petitioner argues... that.., he demonstrated an expectation
of privacy.., since he '[used] the telephone in his house to the exclusion
of all others' [when the police recorded the telephone numbers he
dialed]. 12'
While the petitioner's argument in Smith seems reasonable, the U.S.
Supreme Court viewed this contentless, electronic type of private
information in a different light. The Court stated, "Although petitioner's
conduct may have been calculated to keep the contents of his conversation
private, his conduct.., could not.., preserve the privacy of the number
he dialed."' 22 In other words, the content of telephone conversations is
granted a higher status than numerical, non-content telephone data,
regardless of how private in nature the latter may be.
Further, the fact that one's telephone information is extracted from the
privacy of his home, a constitutionally protected space, is irrelevant. As
the Supreme Court in Smith stated, "The fact that he dialed the number on
his home phone rather than on some other phone could make no
conceivable difference."'' 23 One might ask why privacy is so easily
discarded from a constitutionally protected space, such as one's private
home, in these unique circumstances. The Smith Court explained that it is
because "a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information
he voluntarily turns over to third persons. 1 24 According to the Court's
reasoning, because telephone companies regularly track the numbers
people dial for billing purposes, an individual is effectively forfeiting any
privacy right once he hooks up a telephone and voluntarily uses it. On the
other hand, because one does not regularly disclose his private telephone
conversations to his carrier, the
conversations themselves remain within
12 5
one's expectation of privacy.
Therefore, despite the Court's allusion to "content" in other portions of
the Smith judgment, the underlying rationale for the Court's reasoning has
little to do with the fact that phone conversations are contentful, while
mere phone numbers are not. 126 Rather, the Court's reasoning appears to

121. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743.
122. Id. (citing Brief for Petitioner at 6). The Court's remarks here reflect a willingness to
differentiate telephone conversation content from telephone numbers dialed for privacy purposes.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 743-44.
125. See id.
126. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44.
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depend on the voluntariness
of turning over otherwise "private"
12 7
information to third parties.
At first blush, the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning in Smith seems
flawed because there is an absence of voluntariness and choice on the part
of the telephone service subscriber. After all, one has no option but to have
his telephone numbers tracked by his carrier if he is to be billed for his
calls.
The U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning seems additionally dubious when
the case law of Florida and other states is taken into account. Florida's
equivalent to the Fourth Amendment, namely article I, section 12 of the
Florida Constitution, has been used to create a reasonable expectation of
privacy surrounding pen register data (e.g., Shaktman v. State), 28 in direct
contrast to the Smith holding. Thus, as the Shaktman case exposes, the
view of the Florida Supreme Court regarding pen register data and its
privacy differs sharply from that of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the Florida Supreme Court's reasoning in Shaktman
completely undermines that of the U.S. Supreme Court in Smith, by
pointing out that individuals do not voluntarily surrender their numbers to
their telephone company. 29 It follows that, in Florida, one's privacy
expectation is not affected by the fact that the telephone company knows
what numbers an individual has dialed. 3 ° When commenting on the
privacy invasion potential of pen register technology, the Florida Supreme
Court noted that "[t]he telephone numbers an individual dials.., represent
personal information which . . . the individual has no intention of

communicating to a third party. This personal expectation is not defeated
by the fact that the telephone company has access to that information."''
Here, the Florida Supreme Court chose to adopt the position of the
Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Sporleder'32 on pen register privacy,
rather than aligning itself with the U.S. Supreme Court and the existing
Smith precedent. 133 The Supreme Court of Hawaii has similarly held that
people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the numerical
electronic data that their telephones emit, particularly in the numbers they
dial, as per State v. Rothman.134 The fact that there is no traditional

127. See id.

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 151 (Fla. 1989).
Id.
Id.
Id.
People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 141 (Colo. 1983).
Shaktman, 553 So. 2d at 151.
Hawaii v. Rothman, 779 P.2d 1, 7 (Haw. 1989).
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"content" to the numbers dialed, and no conversation intercepted, does not
reduce the right of privacy attached to this electronic telephone-based
data. 135
At first impression, it appears that Shaktman creates a divergence
between article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution and the Fourth
Amendment, insofar as electronic telephone data and its privacy is
concerned. However, this appearance is deceiving because the 1982
amendments to the Florida Constitution brought section 12 in line with the
Fourth Amendment, and thereafter prohibited Florida from providing any
greater privacy than the Fourth Amendment afforded. In other words,
Florida's expectation of privacy in electronic, contentless telephone data
(under Shaktman) was likely overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court's 1979
Smith decision after the Florida constitutional amendments in 1982.
Even in 1981, the shrinking scope of section 12 privacy protection was
foreshadowed by the Florida Supreme Court in Dorsey v. State. In Dorsey,
Justice Overton commented on pocket pagers stating that "[wie. ..hold
that there can be no expectation of privacy in 'beeper' messages sent over
the airwaves and that these messages are not protected by Florida's
wiretap law."' 3 6 This remark is instructive of Florida's position on pen
registers as well, since a pocket pager is so similar to a pen register in
terms of retrievable data. 137 Judging from this stance, the Florida Supreme
Court has not always been committed to preserving Shaktman's
expectation of privacy in telephone numbers (and similar numerical
communications), and Shaktman would eventually lose its legally binding
character as the Fourth Amendment was merged with the Florida
Constitution.
D. Technologies Which Extract Contentless ElectronicInformation:
Those Most Analogous to GPS
Pen register data and GPS are similar in that both are contentless,
electronic, often generated by telephones and, to a certain extent, both are
locational in nature. It follows that the Florida cases on pen registers and
pocket pagers are relevant to any future GPS-related decisions by the
Florida courts since, to date, there are no existing Florida authorities on
GPS privacy.

135. Id.
136. Dorsey v. State, 402 So. 2d 1178, 1180 (Fla. 1981).
137. Note, for analogy's sake, that the type of information retrieved from pocket pagers is
similar to that extracted from a pen register, since both electronic instruments permit the
interception of telephone numbers dialed, but do not retrieve the conversational content of the calls.
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Yet, in addition to the pen register and pocket pager cases, this Article
will consider other telephone-based electronic data which could prove
analogous to GPS. One could consider, for instance, the case law
pertaining to non-GPS electronic tracking devices. There are no cases
discussing GPS in relation to article I, section 23 of the Florida
Constitution, yet two prominent U.S. Supreme Court cases 138 address the
Fourth Amendment privacy implications of "tracking beepers." These
devices are defined as "a radio transmitter, usually battery operated, which
emits period signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver." 139 Thus, the
tracking beepers referred to in this line of cases are a close cousin of
modem GPS trackers, and provide similar locational information about
private individuals.
United States v. Knotts stands for the principle that a tracking beeper
can be planted freely on private individuals, since the beeper does not
invade any expectation of privacy so long as it does not reveal the contents
of a constitutionally protected space 1" (i.e. a private locker, home, or
phone booth) and the same information could have been obtained by the
government through ordinary visual surveillance.14 '
A year later, in United States v. Karo, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified
this issue.42 According to Karo, tracking beepers do not change the fact
that individuals enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
constitutionally protected spaces. 143 Thus, a tracking beeper which reveals
information about a constitutionally protected private space amounts to a
"search," and therefore violates one's reasonable expectation of privacy.'"
Nonetheless, the Court in Karo established a lesser standard for electronic
tracking "searches" than physical searches, observing that "[t]he
monitoring of an electronic device such as a beeper is, of course, less
intrusivethan a full-scale search, but it does reveal a critical fact about the
interior of the premises that the
Government... could not have otherwise
145
obtained without a warrant.'

Therefore, whether one's reasonable expectation of privacy is invaded
depends on whether the same information could have been obtained by the
government through ordinary visual surveillance. Ordinary visual

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277.
Id. at 285.
Id.
Karo, 468 U.S. at 715-16.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 715 (emphasis added).
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surveillance does not include surveillance involving superhuman
capabilities that electronic tracking devices afford. Even if the police
physically view an object being moved into a private home from the
exterior, in the absence of an attached tracking device, the police could not
have known how long the item remained in the home, or that the tracked
object had not been removed. 4 6 This additional information is not
obtainable through ordinary visual surveillance and government
acquisition of it would therefore violate the Fourth Amendment's privacy
protections under Karo.147
As the Court in Karo insisted,
For the purposes of the [Fourth] Amendment, the result is the same
where, without a warrant, the Government surreptitiously employs
an electronic device to obtain information that it could not have
obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of the
house .... Even if visual surveillance has revealed that the article
to which the beeper is attached has entered the house, the later
monitoring4 . . . also establishes that the article remains on the
premises.1 1
Based on the Court's reasoning in Karo, government entities should not
use tracking devices at all, since doing so would create a risk that
"superhuman" information will be extracted in violation of constitutional
privacy. Rarely is it possible to obtain the same information through visual
surveillance as one would acquire with an electronic tracking device.
Hypothetically, apply the Karo reasoning to GPS devices in cellular
telephones. The facts of the cellular telephone scenario are distinguishable
because the police generally do not plant GPS tracking devices into cell
phones. Cellular telephones are already equipped with GPS locators when
voluntarily purchased. Yet, considering Karo as applied to a police suspect
tracked through cell phone GPS, the tracking would likely amount to the
"superhuman" type of surveillance the U.S. Supreme Court condemned in
Karo, namely the type which invades a person's expectation of privacy (in
a private car, home, or wherever the locational data was retrieved).
Concededly, the same tracking data would not have been possible through

146. Id.
147. Karo, 468 U.S. at 715.
148. Id. This is not unlike the reasoning of the Fifth District Court of Appeals of Florida in
Johnson v. State, in which a tracking beeper had been placed on an airplane without a warrant,
amounting to an "illegal entry." Johnson v. State, 492 So. 2d 693, 694 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
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ordinary visual surveillance, unless conducted twenty-four hours a day. As
the Washington Supreme Court commented in State v. Jackson,
[U]nlike binoculars or a flashlight, the GPS device does not merely
augment the officer's senses, but rather provides a technological
substitute for traditional visual tracking. Further, the devices in this
case were in place for approximately two and one-half weeks. It is
unlikely that the sheriffs department could have successfully
maintained uninterrupted 24-hour surveillance throughout this time
by following Jackson. 4 9
Jackson is instructive because, rather than concerning the outdated
form of a tracking beeper, it involved an actual GPS locator that the police
had planted on a suspect's car. The Jackson court analyzed these facts
using a Washington State constitution provision similar to the Fourth
Amendment and Florida's article I, section 12. In Jackson, the privacy
invasion was clear. There was indeed an expectation of privacy in one's
locational data, and invasive GPS tracking should not be viewed on the
same plane as harmless visual surveillance (contrary to the approach taken
in Knotts).15 ° The Washington Supreme Court stated, "We do not agree
that the use of the GPS devices to monitor Mr. Jackson's travels merely
equates to following him on public roads where he has voluntarily exposed
himself to public view."151

The Jackson decision was reached through consideration of State v.
Campbell, a tracking beeper case from the Oregon Supreme Court.152
Referring to Campbell, the Jackson court observed that "use of a device
that enabled the police to locate a person within a 40-mile radius day or
night 'is a significant limitation on freedom from scrutiny' and 'a
staggering limitation upon personal freedom." 153 Jacksonemphasized the
invasiveness of GPS technology on personal privacy, stating that "the
intrusion into private affairs made possible with a GPS device is quite
extensive." 14
The opposite approach was taken by the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of
Appeals in UnitedStates v. Mclver.55
' Like Jackson, Mclver is one of the

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 223 (Wash. 2003) (emphasis added).
Id. at 223-24.
Id.
Id. at 224 (referring to State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040 (Or. 1988)).
Id.
Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223.
United States v. Mclver, 186 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1999).
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few cases directly addressing privacy rights in connection with GPS
technology. 5 6 Yet, unlike Jackson, the Mclver court found no privacy
invasion in GPS locational data, so long as the government's GPS
instrument was attached to the exterior of one's car and not the car's
interior. 57 The circuit court noted that a government intrusion into the
interior of one's private car would be an entirely different matter and
would indeed have raised Fourth Amendment concerns. 158 In Mclver, the
Fourth Amendment question did not require further analysis because the
police GPS device had been attached to the exterior of the defendant's
vehicle. 159
The curious pattern which McIver reveals is that some courts gauge
locational data relative to the placement of the tracking instrument,
without considering whether the data itself might threaten constitutional
privacy.1" By contrast, Jacksonshows that some courts consider the actual
data obtained and its relation to privacy, without regard to the placement
of the tracking instrument. 161 It seems likely that, as GPS instruments
become more common, the courts will eventually harmonize these two
contrasting analyses. Yet, at the present time, it is unclear which model
should be followed. In the Jackson type of analysis, the retrieved data is
what constitutes a constitutional privacy invasion. Only the tracking
device's placement inside a protected space has entered the court's debate
since the Mclver model. The locational data is not even considered as
personal information.
Applying these two contrasting models to the GPS data of cellular
telephones is challenging because it is not clear which type of legal
reasoning is appropriate. However, Jackson is arguably better adapted to
the physical nature of cell phones because government action in the
cellular telephone realm is largely limited to wiretapping, including the
court-ordered interception of GPS locational data. The government will
almost never physically plant a tracking device in one's telephone. This
important fact virtually eliminates the utility and applicability of the
Mclver analysis to cell phone GPS.
By contrast, the Jackson reasoning remains relevant to the cellular
telephone environment because only data is retrieved when a governmentordered GPS wiretap occurs. Thus, with only the extracted GPS data

156.
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Id. at 1126-27.
Id.
Id.
Id.
McIver, 186 F.3d at 1126-27.
State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 222-25 (Wash. 2003).
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available for the courts to examine (and no beeper placement), Jackson's
discussion of what government-retrieved GPS data discloses is more
pertinent to cell phones than the Mclver physical-search rationale.
Finally, since the Jackson court found a Fourth Amendment (article 1,
section 12 of the Florida Constitution) expectation with respect to GPS
locational information, it follows that the broader section 23 type of
privacy almost certainly would exist.
To date, there is only one American case which considers the privacy
of GPS data based specifically on whether the GPS device in question is
part of a cellular telephone. For guidance and clarification, this case is
examined more closely in the following section of this Article.
E. Technologies Which Extract Contentless Electronic Information:
When GPS is Partof the CellularTelephone
In United States for an OrderAuthorizing the Roving Interception of
Oral Communications (Roving),162 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did
not discuss constitutional privacy, but instead dealt with GPS cellular
163
privacy by addressing the federal wiretapping and interception statute.
This wiretapping analysis is nonetheless pertinent to the constitutional
debate on GPS cellular privacy. In fact, the Roving court makes various
assertions about GPS cellular privacy which coincide with the Florida
courts' own constitutional reasoning for sections 12 and 23. They could
easily be imported into this body of Florida jurisprudence in the current
absence of constitutional cases addressing GPS subject matter.
In Roving, the FBI sought a federal wiretap order to intercept the
64
cellular communications and GPS locational data of certain suspects.
These suspects were known to own a particular luxury vehicle, and all
models of this luxury car were equipped internally with a GPS-cellular
device. 165 The car company had an independent manufacturer for the GPS
devices, which had a call center through which it tracked its cars' GPS
location, when required, and managed all cellular calls. 166 Owners of the
company's vehicles would regularly contact the call center with their
internal cellular telephone to receive driving directions, emergency
assistance, or directions to nearby restaurants and services, and were billed
162. United States for an Order Authorizing the Roving Interception of Oral Commc'ns, 349
F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003).
163. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2002); 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2002); 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1998); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2522 (1994). Sections 2510 and 2518 were given closest attention in this case.
164. Roving, 349 F.3d at 1133-37.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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in proportion to the airtime used. 167 In case of an airbag eruption, the car's
cellular sytem was automatically activated to communicate with the client
and ensure safety. 168 On the basis of these facts, the Roving court
determined that the car company was a cellular service provider, offering
a "wire or electronic communications service," much like any other
cellular telephone company. 169 The device in the car was similarly deemed
to be like any other GPS-equipped cellular telephone. 7 °
The question raised in Roving is whether, absent a court order to track
and eavesdrop on the GPS-cell phone user, does the owner of the device
have a reasonable expectation of privacy, both in his locational data and
private conversations. Treating the integrated GPS and cellular
components as one unit, the circuit court said that the users indeed had an
expectation of privacy, because "the occupants of the vehicle reasonably
expected that the words spoken between them would be private."'' 1 Thus,
an interception order was necessary before the cellular provider, on behalf
of police, could listen in on the user's private conversations.
In Roving, the
172
police were denied such an interception order.
In this way, the telephone's GPS element enjoyed the privacy
protection afforded to personal conversations. Had the GPS unit been part
of a separate, non-telephonic device, it is unclear that any expectation of
privacy would have been recognized by the court. The Roving court chose
to remain silent on this specific issue, however, and mentioned little of the
GPS component at all.
What was clear about the GPS-cellular unit was that the car company
was statutorily bound to hold its clients' locational and telephonic
information in strict confidence, thereby reinforcing the expectation of
privacy underlying the GPS devices and the data they transmit. The federal
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b), provides that carriers cannot disclose their
clients' GPS-cellular information in the absence of a government warrant,
unless they do so with the clients' consent or when the company's GPS-

167. Id. at 1133-34.
168. Id. at 1134.
169. Roving, 349 F.3d at 1140-41.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1138.
172. Id. at 1144-47. The interception order was denied because it could not have been
accomplished "with a minimum of interference," under the circumstances. Id. at 1144. This is
because the clients, while being eavesdropped on, could not make any outgoing communications
to the call center, and therefore would not benefit from the cellular service they had paid for. Id.
at 1144-46. The minimal intrusiveness (narrow tailoring) requirement also applied to the GPS
manufacturer, whose resources and personnel would have been drained by carrying out the FBI's
interception order for 4 months of 24-hour surveillance. Id.

GPS TECHNOLOGY IN CELLULAR TELEPHONES

cellular data shows that a crime is underway. This statute states that a
carrier may disclose a client's GPS or cellular communications
information "to a Federal, State, or local government entity, if the
provider, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger or
death or serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure without
delay of communications relating to the emergency."17 3 Although purely
speculative, it may be this urgency which entitles the carrier to eavesdrop
on clients and locate them with GPS every time an airbag is activated.
In short, even though a court does not engage in constitutional analysis,
Roving supports a presumption that there is a privacy expectation in GPS,
provided that the GPS apparatus is integrated into a cellular telephone.
IV. CLOSING CONSIDERATIONS

A. What Is the Privacy Trend in the FloridaLegislature?
Although the authorities discussed here generally suggest some degree
of privacy protection in GPS information, whether there is a trend in the
Florida legislature supporting this protection is a separate question.
Assuming, based on the foregoing case law and discussion, that article I,
sections 12 and 23 of the Florida Constitution support a GPS privacy
expectation, would the current Florida legislature agree?
There are two GPS bills which have been proposed in the Florida
legislature. Although they do not address personal GPS location data in
cellular telephones, and may never become law, both bills illustrate a trend
to remove GPS privacy protection, rather than expand it under sections 12
or 23.
In brief, House Bill 1283 has been introduced to require the 24-hour
GPS monitoring of certain types of sex offenders. There is also House Bill
0943, which will require bail bond agents to enforce the GPS locational
tracking of any pre-trial releasees. Both bills are intended to use GPS
technology in a way that removes any expectation of privacy in one's
locational information, albeit only for indicted or convicted persons
already in some form of detention. Nonetheless, if the Florida legislature
has any concerns about the use or abuse of spreading GPS technologies,
its concern does not seem to be directed at the privacy threat which GPS
might pose constitutionally under sections 12 or 23 of article I.

173. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (2002).
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B. Observations and FinalAnalysis
1. Section 23
As the foregoing Florida cases and discussion suggest, section 23
(article I) of the Florida Constitution has a greater possibility of extension
to GPS subject matter than section 12. Yet, the greatest challenge to
section 23 is the balancing test it entails.'74 That is to say, while section 23
may support an expectation of privacy in some GPS subject matter, the
applicable balancing test is so restrictive that a privacy right rarely
survives it. Under section 23 analysis, the compelling state interest
frequently wins out when balanced against the alleged privacy right. 7 '
This is not surprising since very little can be expected to take precedence
over a compelling state interest, including a fundamental constitutional
right. The Florida case law considered here attests to this fact, 176 as does
the federal case law which originally inspired the creation of Florida's
section 23.177
There is one further obstacle to section 23's protection of GPS privacy,
and that is the third prong of the Winfield test. 78 After the claimant's
privacy expectation is established, the government may show that it had
a compelling state interest in obtaining the claimant's personal
information, and that it obtained such information through the "least
intrusive means."' 79 Unfortunately for claimants of GPS privacy or any
privacy expectation, the government can often defeat a section 23
argument by meeting this "least intrusive means" prong. As many cases
show, this is because a search warrant or subpoena is the "least intrusive
means" and therefore meets the third and final requirement of the Winfield
test. 8 ° Similarly, a court order under Florida's wiretapping and
interception statute"' would presumably meet the "least intrusive means"
174. Forsberg v. Hous. Auth. of Miami Beach, 455 So. 2d 373, 379 (Fla. 1984).
175. Id.at 379-80; Winfield v. Div. ofPari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544,548 (Fla. 1985);
Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 152 (Fla. 1989).
176. See cases cited supranote 175.
177. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602-06 (1977); California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416
U.S. 21, 52-54 (1974).
178. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 548.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Under Florida Statutes chapter 934.01,
[T]he Legislature makes the following findings: ...(4) To safeguard the privacy
of innocent persons, the interception of wire or oral communications when none
of the parties to the communication has consented to the interception should be
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threshold, thereby canceling out the claimant's section 23 legitimate
privacy expectation.
2. Section 12
The section 12 test also poses barriers which may restrict the courts'
ability to find an expectation of privacy in GPS locational subject matter.
As summarized above, the law does not clearly show that section 12
supports a privacy expectation for publicly-made cellular communications.
It is even less clear that section 12 might protect GPS data alone (in the
absence of cellular communication).
Yet, even if there were a reasonable expectation of privacy under these
tests, a court could find that one's personal GPS data was not unlawfully
seized or intercepted if the government obtained a wiretap or interception
order in advance. Most cases recognize searches as "reasonable," avoiding
constitutional scrutiny, where a warrant has been obtained to authorize a
police search. 182 It follows that a wiretap or interception court order would
similarly fulfill this "reasonableness" requirement under article I, section
12 of the Florida Constitution (Fourth Amendment).
C. Conclusion
In short, the subject matter covered by section 23's disclosural privacy
cannot be delineated with a simple, bright-line test. Admittedly, the reach
of Florida Constitution article I, section 23 remains to be developed and
expanded in the case law. However, both section 23 and, to a lesser extent,
section 12 have the potential to support an expectation of privacy in purely
cellular telephone conversations. It is less apparent that sections 12 and 23

allowed only when authorized by a court of competent jurisdiction ....
Interception of wire and oral communications should further be limited to certain
major types of offenses and specific categories of crime ....
FLA. STAT. ch. 934.01 (2002). However, it is not entirely clear that a court is authorized to make
a GPS interception order under this statute. This is because Florida Statutes chapter 934.01 only
permits interception and wiretap orders for "wire and oral communications." FLA STAT. ch.
934.02(1) (defining "wire communication" as a means requiring "the aid of wire, cable or other like
connection"). LA STAT. ch. 934.02(2) (2002) (defining "oral communication" as "any oral
communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not
subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation and does not mean any
public oral communication uttered at a public meeting or any electronic communications").
However, GPS data cannot qualify as an "electronic communication" because Florida Statutes
chapter 934.02(12) explicitly prohibits it.
182. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
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could support a privacy expectation in GPS data alone. Yet, once a GPS
device is integrated within a cellular telephone, the marriage of these two
functions affords greater privacy to one's GPS information. The case law
reviewed above supports this view.
Having made this assertion, one must consider that even where section
23 may allow a privacy expectation in GPS data, the law may prevent a
constitutional privacy interest from being assured. This is because
Florida's constitutional privacy under article I, sections 12 and 23 is so
easily defeated by a police search warrant or an interception order.
The section 23 balancing test is also a barrier, since this test prioritizes
the state's compelling interest ahead of the individual's constitutionally
guaranteed rights. As the case law presented here illustrates, many state
interests can be construed as compelling, certainly where crime prevention
is the state interest at issue.
Considering the totality of these factors, section 12 or 23 may assure
GPS-cellular privacy only where government intrusion into GPS data has
been made without a warrant, subpoena, or any other indicator of
"minimal intrusiveness." Furthermore, as argued here, a GPS-cellular
privacy claimant would have greater success relying on section 23 than the
more restrictive section 12.
Although there are no firm answers to these privacy questions in the
Florida cases, all hope is not lost for GPS privacy and its potential for
constitutional protection. Future Florida jurisprudence will bear important
landmarks in the use and privacy of locational GPS, a technology which
has suddenly become widespread and whose role in public life is
expanding at an alarming rate. At present, the Florida legislature may not
recognize an expectation of privacy in GPS data. However, the
fundamentals exist for the Florida Supreme Court to conclude otherwise,
paving the way for other states to follow.

